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Abstract
The term body-snatcher has enjoyed a renaissance in the media recently, as various Mäori 
have moved to reclaim their deceased relations. From a Mäori perspective, the claiming 
of bodies has nothing to do with body-snatching, a term that referred to episodes in the 
West. Indeed, Mäori may see some laws themselves as instruments that snatch the body, 
in contravention of Mäori customs. One of these laws, the Coroners Act 2006, may have 
made some progress by quietly acknowledging these customs in many ways, but that is 
merely the start of a greater dialogue between Mäori and the Crown in relation to proper 
Mäori respect of the dead body.
Introduction
The media and public incandescence surrounding the 2007 events of body-snatching, 
a term which first gained currency in relation to the taking or disinterment of a body for 
anatomical research in 18th century Britain and which has now been remoulded to fit 
the Mäori practice of claiming a body, revealed a dangerous assumption that cultures 
appropriate a dead body for the same reasons. At the same time as the specific incidents 
of body-snatching were unwinding, the Coroners Act 2006 came into force. While earlier 
Mäori concerns about the nature of this amendment generally, and of antecedent legislation 
more specifically, as instruments capable of snatching bodies have been expressed, the 
Coroners Act 2006 passed into the public domain with complete equanimity. 
In this article I seek to address the wider discursive1 connotations and the historical contexts 
of body-snatching in the West. What emerges is a recognition that body-snatching has 
been occurring in the West for millennia. With legislation introduced in the early 19th 
century in the United Kingdom and the United States to discourage body-snatching in 
its crudest forms, the practice of body-snatching was meant to have been put to rest. 
However, legislation serves the culturally dominant, and has acted to define what body-
snatching is and what the legalized retention of the dead body is. In Mäori eyes, although 
an improvement on its antecedent, the provisions of the Coroners Act 2006 may still chime 
with legalized body-snatching but body-snatching nonetheless, especially as the Act does 
not reflect a respect for the sacred nature of the body.
1. Foucault (1978:100-101) provides an explanation for the usefulness of discourse, even when it appears to be 
solely destructive:
 … discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences 
are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.
 The use of the term ‘body-snatching’ by the media may therefore provide us with the impetus to consider our 
current language and practice dealing with the dead body in relation to colonised discourse and practice. In 
an almost contrary sense, then, wide use of the term ‘body-snatching’ allows us to theorise widely around 
dominance and rejuvenation of new forms of knowledge. Our traditional descriptions may also be able to 
thrive unseen, while the dominant term is being indiscriminately used.
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The rise of the “body-snatchers”: media coverage
The information that most of us are presented with dealing with the recent body-snatching 
controversies is promulgated through the media. Unless we are part of the affected families 
then it is unlikely that we will have a full grasp of the events. The media began to publicize the 
events around James Takamore after his body had been removed from a Christchurch marae 
(meeting complex, where the body is laid before burial) in August 2007, with an evident bias 
towards his wife’s experience rather than that of his extended family. An article, published 
in the New Zealand Herald on 21 August 2007, quoted the wife’s sentiments directly, but 
only indirectly reported what a representative of the extended family had to say (Family row 
sees body taken before funeral, 2007). The matter was merely reported as being subject to 
Mäori protocol. A similar preference of the feelings of the widow emerged in a subsequent 
article in the New Zealand Herald on 22 August 2007, this time, however, with a direct quote 
from Takamore’s sister, in which she describes the need for him to be returned to his marae in 
Kutarere: ‘… his [umbilical] cord is here, we can’t stretch it to the South Island.’  (Burial defies 
court order, 2007).
It was not until 24 August 2007 that the term “body-snatcher” was used in the New Zealand 
Herald; together with some poems composed by Jim Hopkins (2007) which favoured the 
position of the immediate family, the title read “Jim Hopkins: Body Snatchers delight! Police 
have fled the fight.” This article, on the one hand, dealt with the bereft immediate family and, 
on the other, the apparently devious and primitive nature of the extended family. Thus “body-
snatcher[s]” was utilized in the same space and breath as phrases as “Rousseau’s noble savage.” 
The significance of this conjunction of phrases here is that body-snatcher was beginning to 
attract powerful currency; this potency would start to underpin and describe Mäori attempts 
at striking a spiritual equilibrium within their own culture. It would not be until 8 September 
2007 that this newspaper would attempt an investigation which appeared to involve direct 
speech from both sides.
Body-snatching and all its variations, including “snatched body”, the unhyphenated 
“bodysnatching” and so on, continued to be widely used in the remainder of the articles 
dealing with James Takamore. It is beyond the scope of this article to deconstruct the context 
of these terms within the media; however, it is safe to state that the term started to figure more 
prominently when the Takamore case was joined by those of Tina Marshall-McMenamin and 
Ivy May Ngahooro (who was Päkehä [New Zealander of European descent]). The phenomenon 
became one which highlighted cultural mismatches under the rubric of “body-snatching”. The 
term was quickly becoming the established vernacular for different sets of events involving 
different whänau (extended families), hapü (sub-tribes) and iwi (tribes). It became a common 
rejoinder that the only solution would be one sourced in law, as there was apparently a current 
lacuna in the law which allowed the despicability of body-snatching to take place.2
2. Dr Wallace Bain, Acting Chief Coroner as at 10 March 2008, noted that the law was ineffective in dealing with 
cases where bodies had been claimed, and proposed that coroners be notified of all deaths and have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the custody of the dead bodies (Coroner proposes ‘body snatching’ law change, 2008). The 
coroner would then determine who could have access to the body until its release.
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The sensationalism of the term
The term body-snatching is rarely read through literal, dispassionate eyes. The phrase involves 
a hint of desecration. This connotation is borne out in the media, with such comments as “… 
it's the lowest of the low to essentially steal human remains from loving family” (Law limited in 
body-snatching cases, 2008). Within the sensationalism of this terminology resides the immoral. 
“Snatching” hints at a forceful taking,  a quick and hasty assumption of something. Moreover, 
where a thing could be taken with negotiation in mind, and with the power of reasonableness 
infusing this taking, snatching appears to evoke a unilateral taking. Where reason is absent then 
the taking of the thing is seen to be without proper form and without careful consent from the 
side initially holding the thing. Compounded with “body”, which itself is a culturally contestable 
term, ‘snatching’ assumes a touch of connivance. In the use of this term a subterranean 
deprivation of personality occurs; the body is given away as being a thing and the thing can be 
moved from one sphere to another.  
The phenomenon of body-snatching in the West
Snatching bodies, in fact, has occurred in the West for millennia. The epoch spanning 300–200 
BC, to start with, was an unfortunate one for criminals, whose bodies were often tendered for 
operations. Herophilus and Erasistratus figured highly in these times as major proponents of 
vivisection and dissection. They discovered various functions of the nerves, circulation and the 
eyes (Singer, 1957), mostly in their experiments with cadavers, but also often with live criminals. 
Much later, the Roman scholar Celsus described the phenomenon of vivisection in these early 
times: criminals were reined in “for dissection alive, and contemplated, even while they breathed, 
those parts which nature had before concealed” (Persaud 2002, cited by Mika 2005, p.14). 
These experiments, obviously, occurred against the will of the criminals and involved what the 
historian Tertullian, in the case of Herophilus, described as “[a hatred of] mankind for the sake 
of knowledge” (Persaud 2002, cited by Mika 2005, p.14).
In general, Christianity and the collapse of the Roman Empire in the early Middle Ages saw 
a concomitant decline in the practice of human dissection (Nutton, 1996) and dead bodies 
were more likely to be left alone.  The Roman Catholic church’s strictures against human 
dissection were more prohibitive in a specific sense than widely injunctive; dismemberment 
of slain crusaders’ bodies was ceased, for instance, and the edict Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine 
(The church shrinks from blood; Porter, 1997) proclaimed it was wrong for a cleric of the church 
to be involved in blood-shedding. Prayer was the standard cure-all and illness was ascribed to 
a spiritual realm. Sometimes illness could be caused by some intervention of God, sometimes 
from the intervention of Satan and his minions. Frequent epidemics of smallpox and the bubonic 
plague were believed to be the result of God’s wrath (Porter, 1997). At the same time, any hope 
of salvation relied on the body being kept intact. It could not be fragmented or dismembered. 
According to Walter (1996, p. 114) “resurrection had to involve the whole body. Fragmentation 
of the body was a symbol of hell.” The limitations placed on human dissection meant that 
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medical students had to rely on the (now) notoriously unreliable works of Galen. The 
powerful Roman Catholic church actively supported Galen’s works (Singer, 1957), which 
relied on the dissection of animals, the tissue of which often bears little resemblance to 
that of humans. 
Body-snatching acknowledged
It would not be until 1543, when Belgian anatomist Andreas Vesalius completed De Humani 
corporis fabrica, libri septem [On the structure of the human body, in seven books], that 
the age of corpse dissection would gain respect. Vesalius would recover corpses at night 
(Goddard, 2003) and would tell students to take note of the least healthy patients so that 
the students could prepare to recover them when they finally died. Legend has it that he 
would sleep at night with the corpses in his bedroom—partly to avoid persecution by the 
authorities but also to perform dissections when he felt the need. His works would much 
later come to be described as perhaps the greatest contribution to the area of anatomy 
(Castiglioni, 1958).
Until the 18th century there were discrete attempts to assume possession of the corpse for 
the advancement of medical science. The 18th century itself grew to become fascinated 
with pathological anatomy and bodies were procured for the few dissections which 
took place in Britain within the private houses of medics; Saint Thomas’s hospital had a 
dissecting room by 1780 but, in general there was still a sense that the body had to be kept 
intact. However, the demand for corpses for dissection soon outstripped the number, as 
legally only the bodies of criminals could be given to science, and bodies were procured 
illegally at any cost. The chief method was to dig them up as soon as possible after burial 
(Mika, 2005). This disturbing time was a lucrative one for “resurrectionists”, and it reached 
its zenith when two unsavoury characters, Burke and Hare, were alerted to police for 
killing would-be cadavers before providing them to the Edinburgh Medical School. It was 
estimated that these two resurrectionists may have murdered 16 people (Porter, 1997). In 
a macabre twist, Hare gave evidence against his colleague, Burke, who was executed and, 
perversely, given to Edinburgh Medical School for anatomical research.
Body-snatching was also occurring in the USA. One particularly prominent instance is the 
New York Riot of 1788, which lasted three days and occurred after some children, peering 
into the Society of the Hospital of the City of New York, saw medical students dissecting 
various cadavers—one of which was the children’s dead mother (Walker, 2000). A mob 
of 5000 soon resulted, which stormed the hospital and could only be suppressed by the 
military. Other regular instances particularly involved Afro-Americans (Walker, 2000) and 
Native Americans (Farrell, 1998), who, it was generally thought, were less capable of 
resistance.
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The legalising of body donation
With the impetus of those recent events, and because of Burke and Hare in particular, the 
practice of body donation was finally legalized pursuant to the Warburton Anatomy Act 
1832 in Britain and the Anatomy Act of 1831 in Massachusetts.  Unclaimed bodies could 
be handed over to anatomists; consequently the body-snatching trade ended. However, it 
was not until Sir Jeremy Bentham demanded the preservation of his own body in his will, 
was preserved in a wooden cabinet called his Auto-icon, and was donated to the University 
College London in 1850, that the stigma of donation was overcome. Thus pauper status 
was still generally attached to body donation; while the Warburton Anatomy Act in Britain 
did end predation by snatchers, allowing more well-heeled classes to give their bodies 
over to science, the donated body was still thought of as largely being less fortunate.
Can the law snatch bodies? Case study: Coroners Act 2006
The donation of body parts is one aspect of a contested view of the body in the West, and 
its legalisation in Britain and the USA with the Warburton Anatomy and Anatomy Acts, 
respectively, shows that religion, politics and philosophy have colluded with the body as 
a central focus. While it is not safe to say that the activities of anatomists and lawmakers 
necessarily represented the general populace (there were, after all, a number of religious 
detractors to the donation of body tissue), the retention of the body by the State to ensure 
that a proper explanation could be provided for a death, on the other hand, appears 
always to have been legal. The State has consistently deemed it necessary for unusual 
deaths to be accounted for. It is out of this necessity that the office of the coroner arose.
There are of course numerous laws which have always allowed for the detention of the 
living body: those dealing with criminal acts and mental health are foremost among them. 
Yet the law has shown itself to be remarkably timid when dealing with the dead body—
due, as we have seen, to an historical apprehensiveness towards the spiritual and legal 
significance of the dead body. The coroner exemplifies a significant exception here, as 
he—and in the early history of the Office of the Coroner, the coroner was always male—
was sanctioned from early times to retain the dead body. The label ‘coroner’ with its full 
hint of office first appears from pre-Norman times (Knight, 2007). However, coroners, 
as they are commonly known today, originate from the times of Richard the Lionheart 
(1157–1199). Article 20 of the Articles of Eyre, dating from September 1194, empowered 
the Office of the Coroner to “keep the pleas of the Crown” (Knight, 2007) and to provide 
a local county officer to ensure that the Crown’s financial integrity was preserved during 
criminal proceedings. To “keep the pleas” differed from “holding the pleas” which meant 
to actually hear pleas and to pass sentence (Knight, 2007), a task assigned solely to judges 
who presided over Assize Courts, although Knight asserts that coroners and sheriffs did 
hold the pleas for some short duration after the coroners’ inception. 
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Through to medieval times, in fact, the coroner’s role was quite broad and he could 
become involved in many aspects of the complicated legal system. The main role, though, 
was to investigate sudden deaths. Investigating murder, manslaughter, accidental and 
natural deaths and suicide was his domain, although finding out relevant criminals was 
not his concern (Knight, 2007). The process around notifying the coroner of a death to 
be investigated, or even raising a hue and cry to hunt for a murderer, was a fraught one 
and involved adhering to rules. Deviating from these rules proved expensive, so that it 
was not uncommon for the first finder to actually ignore the dead body or else to drag it 
to another village (Knight, 2007). Locals had to guard the body, often for many days, until 
the coroner arrived so that their village was not stung financially for diverging from the 
rules of holding the body until the coroner could investigate.
With a growing concern around poisons, together with poor medical investigations into 
some murders (The Coroners’ Society of England and Wales: A brief history, 2007) in 
the 19th century, the coroner’s role became more narrowly focused on determining the 
circumstances and medical causes of deaths that were violent, sudden and unnatural. 
Therefore there remained an overlap with the more ancient role of the coroner but 
subsequent legislation meant that the coroner was no longer required to focus on revenue. 
It is this central role that survives, although the ways in which the coroner may carry 
this role out have changed; in New Zealand, substantial modifications to the rules which 
dictate the coroner’s behaviour have recently been enacted, particularly in relation to how 
the coroner, fundamentally speaking, may relate to the body. 
Previous coroner legislation in New Zealand
That Mäori have been adversely affected by the law is well documented, and is an 
understated and self-evident assertion. Various laws have imposed individualized land 
title, have explicitly and subtly prevented Mäori from carrying out their healing practices, 
and have defined them as criminals or as schizophrenics in extravagant numbers. The 
Coroners Act 1988 arguably just carried on the colonizing mission with a specific focus 
on helping to redefine and retain the dead body. There was no counter to or even relief 
from its provisions. Pahl (1993) cites a list of incidents involving antecedents of the current 
Coroners Act which one might recoil from instinctively but which were not preventable by 
invoking other law. Specifically involving Mäori3, and involving the unnecessary removal 
of tissue, these incidents include: the removal of a heart from a baby that died of cot death; 
the removal of organs from an elderly lady without permission from family members; part 
3. In one appearance that I made at an inquest I was disturbed at how the Coroners Act 1988 was not able to 
cope with tikanga Mäori (Mäori customs; correct practices) at all levels. This inquest involved the death of 
an elderly Mäori woman who was released by a junior doctor. This woman was taken to a marae, and the 
Coroner ordered her retrieval from the marae as her death had to be investigated. Police uplifted her body 
from the marae. At this very early stage, the Coroners Act 1988 would not take into account the wishes of 
the family, and the postmortem was performed.
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of the brain from someone who died of lung cancer; and the heart from a person who 
died in a mental hospital. The Law Commission (1999) cites another important example:
The deceased, a Mäori, died in 1992 as a result of head injuries sustained in an 
altercation. The day after the death, the deceased’s spouse was advised that the body 
was being held for a post-mortem …. The next day (two days after the deceased’s 
death), the funeral directors were advised that the body could be collected. On 
arrival at the mortuary, however, they were told by a Police Officer involved in 
the investigation into the cause of death that the brain of the deceased was being 
retained for between 1–14 days. The funeral director passed this information on to 
the family. (pp. 6–7)
The family requested a meeting with the coroner who declined, and said that the brain 
was being examined for defence purposes for a trial. The family finally obtained the brain 
but only after legal proceedings.
It would have been a plausible refrain that those dark times had been left behind in favour 
of a more enlightened epoch if the discovery of 1,300 babies’ hearts at Greenlane Hospital 
(Johnston & Mold, 2002) had not occurred. Exactly how many of these babies were Mäori 
is uncertain, and some of these cases involved the Human Tissues Act 1964 as well as the 
Coroners Act 1988. Fundamental flaws in the legislation demanded a review of relevant 
legislation which, of course, included the Coroners Act 1988.4
The 1988 Act authorized the coroner to order a post-mortem, although the 1988 Act 
signalled a move away from an automatic demand for post-mortems (Wallace & Johnson, 
1996). The coroner was able to still authorise them, pursuant to section 8, after having 
attached such weight as was necessary to various criteria including ethnic origins, social 
attitudes or customs, attitudes of those closely associated with the body and whether those 
associates found post-mortems offensive, and whether there were any customs which 
required that the body be returned as soon as possible after death. How much weight was 
to be attached to these criteria depended on the case before the coroner and was therefore 
a discretionary activity. Section 9 of the 1988 Act authorized the coroner to direct a post-
mortem ‘forthwith’ for those who had “the ethnic origins, social attitudes or custom, or 
spiritual beliefs” which directed that the body be returned to the family without undue 
delay. As soon as possible when the post-mortem was authorized the coroner had to take all 
reasonable steps to notify the family that a post-mortem would take place, together with 
reasons for the authorisation. The coroner was not required to notify families of the post-
mortem prior to its execution. When a post-mortem was to occur, the coroner was able to 
4. The 1983 Working Party on Delays in the Release of Bodies for Burial noted additionally that there were 
concerns around the practices under the 1951 Act, in particular the extent of the delays in releasing the 
bodies for burials and also the nature of post-mortem examinations themselves. On the strength of these 
findings the New Zealand Government legislated for the Coroners Act 1988 (Law Commission, 1999).
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direct that it be limited; however, this occurred rarely. Pursuant to section 14, as soon as 
the post-mortem was completed, the coroner was to authorize the disposal of the body as 
soon as he or she believed that the body no longer had to be retained.5
Although there was no right under the 1988 Act to remove body parts during a post-
mortem, there was conversely no provision expressly forbidding this practice either. 
The right to possession of body parts was unclear if they were removed. Although the 
Department of Justice developed forms which the coroner could use whenever body parts 
were removed and which would then be sent to families (Law Commission, 1999), there 
was no provision in the 1988 Act to require them to use the forms. This omission may have 
stemmed partially from the fact that the pathologist performing the post-mortem did not 
have to tell the coroner that they had removed body parts. In turn, there was no statutory 
requirement for the coroner to notify families that body parts had been removed (Thomas, 
2002). Just as disturbing for Mäori, the 1988 Act did not require the body parts to be 
replaced back within the body. Note also that the Coroners Act 1988 took priority over the 
Human Tissues Act 1964, where the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ 
Rights directs that the coroner must consent to the removal of organs before a post-mortem 
occurs. As at 1999, despite the lack of statutory protection around body parts, hospital 
provision went some way in providing for the regulation around their removal. Health 
Waikato, for instance, directed that no organs or tissue were to be removed if the family 
had not first been notified (Ministry of Mäori Development, 1999), and both the coroner 
and the pathologist signed a form which stated that all parts that had been removed were 
replaced. Pathologists in Christchurch were to advise if they had retained body parts.
No provision existed under the 1988 Act for families to remain with the body either before 
or during a post-mortem, although section 10(3) allowed for a doctor to be present at a 
post-mortem as a result of a person’s application. The doctor would attend as the person’s 
representative. 
Coroners Act 2006
The new Coroners Act brings into stark relief some of the huge shortcomings of its 
immediate predecessor. While it was still in Bill form, Dr Paul Hutchinson cited the 
Greenlane Hospital heart debacle and noted that it provided some of the momentum for 
more thorough informed consent processes around post-mortems, processes which until 
then had been less than satisfactory (Coroners Bill – In Committee, 2006).  Dr Jackie Blue 
continued by noting the express provision in the 2006 Act for stillborn children, absent 
in the former Act, which allowed the coroner to release a stillborn child. Noting that the 
earlier lack of provision might have led to a diversity of practice in relation to the stillborn 
5. The coroner does not have a statutory right to retain the body or body parts, but is entitled under common 
law to ‘possession and control of the body’ (Law Commission, 1999, p.9) from the time that the coroner 
receives a report that warrants investigation until the completion of the inquest.
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child, she also reiterated former speakers’ applause of the provisions dealing with the 
return of body parts.
The provisions under the new Act for the return of body parts are indeed more 
compassionate and more in line with Mäori views of the body.6 However, there is still 
explicit authority for the coroner to retain the body. Section 44 seems at first glance to 
hold back the release of the body but only if parts or samples are to be retained. If the 
coroner is aware that the pathologist wishes to retain a body part or bodily sample then 
he or she may not release the body. The pathologist can retain the body part or bodily 
sample if it is, in their opinion, necessary for the post-mortem to occur, and also only if 
the amount of sample or part is “minute” (s48(2)(a)). If the pathologist feels that they 
have to retain the body part or sample and, presumably, the part or sample is larger than 
minute, then this must be authorized by the coroner, and the pathologist must tell the 
coroner in writing the reasons for retaining the part or sample, and for how long they wish 
to retain it. Additionally, under s48(2)(c) the pathologist may retain the part or sample if 
they have explained to relevant family members or associates that the pathologist wishes 
to retain the part or sample. Any objection means that the pathologist may not retain the 
part or sample. Importantly, however, the pathologist may still retain body parts even if 
permission has not been obtained pursuant to s48(2) but these must generally be returned 
upon the release of the body.7
There are now prescriptive provisions which require the coroner to notify the family and 
other relevant associates of retention, and of their right to request the return of parts and 
samples. The coroner must specify that there is a significant matter ‘in the carrying out of 
the duties and processes required by law to be performed or followed in relation to the 
death’ (s23(1)) and must also tell the family that a part or sample is to be retained. A notice 
must be given to the family which identifies the part or sample, explains the reasons for 
the retention, give an indication of the duration of retention, and indicates, to the best of 
the pathologist’s knowledge, whether the part or sample is likely to be destroyed during 
usage. The family members or other members have five days to request the part or sample 
back once it is no longer needed and if it has not been destroyed or would pose a health 
risk.
Whether a post-mortem occurs at all is still subject to a number of matters which the 
coroner must take into account. The new Act retains much of the language of the former 
1988 Act: for instance, s32(f) still compels the coroner to consider “the desirability of 
6. The role of coroners and their demographic spread is also seen to be a more progressive step for the 
legislation. Coroners are now to be focused more on solely coroner work (they were formally employed 
part-time, often with little financial gain) and they will now undertake work in the provinces, thus enabling 
them to build relationships with communities and to help educate communities.
7. Section 53. Generally assumes importance when the sample or part has been destroyed, or if it is not 
practicable that the part or sample be reunified with the body. Under s54, if the return of the part or sample 
would endanger the health of the public, then the part or sample may be retained.
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minimising the causing of distress to people who, by reason of their ethnic origins, social 
attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs, customarily require bodies to be available to family 
members as soon as possible after death” and, under s32(g) to consider “the desirability of 
minimising the causing of offence to people who, by reason of their ethnic origins, social 
attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs, find post-mortems of bodies offensive.” In some 
cases under the 2006 Act family members may object to a post-mortem being performed, 
specifically where there is no necessity for an immediate post-mortem and where there 
would be no contravention of law if a post-mortem did not occur. Family members and 
other relevant associates must exercise their right to object within 24 hours of having been 
notified that a post-mortem is to occur.
A significant amendment to the old legislation appears with section 25, which permits 
one or more people to remain with the body, or to view or touch the body while the 
body is in the coroner’s custody. This provision applies to members of immediate family, 
representatives, ministers and spiritual advisers. Note that the family of the dead person 
may request that a doctor, nurse or funeral director attend the post-mortem on behalf of 
the family if this is authorized by the coroner, in apparent deference to the needs of the 
family.
Mäori view of the dead body
Mäori have a view of the dead body8 which is expressed in customs dealing with sending 
the spirit on to Hawaiiki, the original homeland of Mäori, encouraging the living to visit 
the dead during the tangihanga (funeral rites), and reminding the living of particular 
obligations towards the dead. Generally Mäori will not allow the dead person to remain 
alone; to do so would suggest that the dead person is indeed dead in a spiritual sense. 
Although there have undoubtedly been changes to the way Mäori regard the dead body 
through colonization, customs around the preservation of the dead person’s spirit and 
the proper respect in sending the spirit on are still fundamentally adhered to. Such a belief 
highlights a difference between dominant Western discourses around death and those 
of Mäori. Thus, while indeed the brain may have ceased activity and the heart stopped 
working, the person is still alive in a spiritual sense, is not completely dead and may not 
be tampered with.9
To Mäori the body is tapu (sacred) and must be kept intact and whole. Such a belief 
accounts for the often vociferous reactions to the Western scientific, anthropological 
and antiquarian practices of retaining preserved heads as curios and measuring skulls to 
apparently ascertain intelligence. Indeed, reasons for contesting practices such as these 
8. One term for the dead body in Mäori is tüpäpaku.
9. Admittedly the process of embalming could be seen to be a tampering with the dead body. Mäori still have 
their dead embalmed by Western-trained embalmers, but there may be greater moves to resuming traditional 
and more culturally appropriate practices of embalmment, including drying techniques (Wikatene, 2006) 
and using earth on the body.
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are not merely traditional; they also converge into the political sphere. Mäori, along with 
other indigenous peoples, are still a source of intrigue to Western scientists, some of whom 
have been involved in obtaining Mäori genetic material for study. See Gardiner (1997), for 
instance, for a description of the concerns which her hapü, Ngäti Hë and Ngäti Te Ahi, 
expressed around Selbourne Biological Services New Zealand Ltd’s activities in conducting 
experiments on the genetic material of hapü members. The Human Genome Diversity 
Project, which sought to conduct investigations into “isolates of historical interest” (Posey 
and Dutfield, 1996, p. 164), also set about gathering genetic material from “endangered” 
indigenous peoples so that disease epidemiologies relative to white Northern American 
and European, and the origins of indigenous peoples, could be identified.  Having heard 
of the experiences of other indigenous peoples who have battled the patenting of their 
genetic material, Mäori are wary of the outcomes of the retention of body parts and 
samples for usage in experiments involving biological warfare and other general forms 
of testing. One well known example involves the Hagahai of Papua New Guinea. These 
people carry a human T-cell leukaemia virus which was of supreme interest to scientists. 
A patent was actually granted over a related unmodified human cell (Mika, 2005) but the 
National Institute of Health was later forced to withdraw the patent due to pressure from 
indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations and foreign governments. Coupled 
with this guardedness is a concept of the body as a reminder and embodiment of its 
ancestors and the landscape, which makes the form of objectification envisaged by the 
retention of body parts, samples and genetic material hard to come to terms with.
While there have undoubtedly been rapid strides in progress with the latest Coroners 
Act legislation, the fact that the body may still be retained at all for post-mortems 
is unpalatable for many Mäori. Granted, there is some benefit to be gained for family 
members by allowing a post-mortem to be undertaken, especially when the post-mortem 
can be carried out as swiftly and sensitively as possible; the family can gain some closure, 
and some medical afflictions which could affect other family members may only come to 
light when a post-mortem is completed. However, to assume that the Coroners Act 2006 is 
a complete rectification of past legislative wrongs and requires no further thought would 
be hasty. For instance, retaining the body parts and samples for any reason is a hindrance 
to any attempts at keeping the body whole. While the 2006 Act is obviously more aware 
of the needs of Mäori in a number of areas, fundamentally the Act does not appear to 
inherently view the dead body in the same way that Mäori would.
Conclusion
This paper challenges the Western media, above all else, to consider its unbridled use 
of the term “body-snatcher”. My belief is that the term, read in the historical context of 
the West and in the light of past and present coronial legislation, is a loaded one which 
cannot be immediately and uncritically attached to the practice of Mäori claims to the 
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dead body. Advocates of “common sense” may try and argue that the distinction between 
claiming the body and snatching the body is semantic and that it is instantly a wrongful 
and harmful act; hence, “snatching” would be a far more appropriate term. Common 
sense, though, is itself culturally read. For Mäori, it is far better to act on their own brand 
of common sense and to protect and respect the body by claiming it than it is to allow 
it to languish elsewhere, particularly given the historical association that anatomy and 
legislation have with the dead body.
Other commentators on the current Coroners Act may simply see the central issue as 
being one of consent. Although it is important that Mäori establish their own fundamental 
guidelines for consent for the retention of the dead body—and these guidelines need 
to be flexible and avoid standardized, homogenized frameworks—the issue is more 
fundamentally about the ability of the law to remain inviolate from accusations of body-
snatching, opening then onto a higher debate around the regard that the law has for the 
body. Is the Coroners Act 2006 capable of being called a “body-snatcher”? If so, is it less of a 
body-snatcher than its 1988 predecessor? Considered against the setting of Mäori spiritual 
beliefs about the body, then there would appear to be no continuum, spanning acceptable 
body-snatching to unacceptable body-snatching. This does not mean, however, that the 
Coroners Act 2006 is merely setting out to snatch the body but in a nicer way. There is no 
doubt that coroners and pathologists are now required to operate in a way which is more 
understanding of Mäori practices around the dead body. At some level, though, there 
needs to be a deeper philosophical contemplation of the cultural association with the 
dead body than the law itself can conceive of, so that more profound Mäori associations 
with the body can find their voice.
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Glossary 
Mäori   English
hapü    sub-tribes
Hawaiiki   the original homeland of Mäori
iwi    tribes 
marae    Mäori meeting complex 
Päkehä    New Zealander of European descent
tangihanga   funeral rites
tapu    sacred
tikanga   customs; correct practices
whänau   extended families
tapu    sacred
whänau   families
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